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Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have caused huge economic losses to society. They have become one 
of the main threats to Internet security. Most of the current detection methods based on a single feature and fixed 
model parameters cannot effectively detect early DDoS attacks in cloud and big data environment. In this paper, an 
adaptive DDoS attack detection method (ADADM) based on multiple kernel learning (MKL) is proposed. Based on 
the burstiness of DDoS attack flow, the distribution of addresses and the interactivity of communication, we define 
five features to describe the network flow characteristic. Based on the ensemble learning framework, the weight of 
each dimension is adaptively adjusted by increasing the inter-class mean with a gradient ascent and reducing the 
intra-class variance with a gradient descent, and the classifier is established to identify an early DDoS attack by 
training simple multiple kernel learning (SMKL) models with two characteristics including inter-class mean 
squared difference growth (M-SMKL) and intra-class variance descent (S-SMKL). The sliding window mechanism 
is used to coordinate the S-SMKL and M-SMKL to detect the early DDoS attack. The experimental results indicate 
that this method can detect DDoS attacks early and accurately. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the security of computer 
networks, chips, virtual networks and mobile 
devices has been widely concerned [1-3]. As an 
important platform for information exchange, 
computer network security has attracted much 
attention. In the security of computer network, 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is yet 
to be settled in a long time. DDoS is a traditional 
network attack method. It controls a large number 
of zombie machines sending a large number of 
invalid network request packets to a target host. It 
consumes and meaninglessly occupies the 
resources of the server, causing normal users to 
be unable to use the normal services provided by 
the target host [4]. Although the DDoS attack 
mode is simpler, its destruction power to the 
network is far more than other network attacks. 
Moreover, this traditional attack method in recent 
years can still cause great damage to the Internet, 
and the frequency of launch, loss caused, 
complexity of DDoS, diversity of DDoS and 
difficulty of defense have increased more than 
before [5]. In June 2016, an ordinary U.S. jewelry 
online sales website was flooded with 35,000 
HTTP requests (spam requests) per second, 
making the site unable to provide normal services. 
In October, DynDNS, which provides dynamic 
DNS services in the United States, was subject to 
large-scale DDoS attacks, resulting in access 
problems for multiple websites using DynDNS 
services, including GitHub, Twitter, Airbnb, 
Reddit, Freshbooks, Heroku, SoundCloud, 
Spotify, and Shopify. Twitter has even appeared 
in nearly 24 hours with a zero-visit situation. The 
reason why DDoS attacks have such a great 
destructive power is that DDoS uses a large 
number of zombie machines to launch attacks on 
a certain target. Each zombie machine has 
powerful computing capability. Through the 
massive distributed processing capabilities of 
zombie machines, it is easy for a server to no 
longer have the ability to provide services to 
normal users [6]. On the other hand, DDoS 
attacks are easy to implement. Unlike other 
network attacks, DDoS attacks require only a 
large number of zombie machines and a small 
amount of network security knowledge to launch 
an effective attack. This easy-to-grasp network 
attack method makes the DDoS attack more 
powerful. 
At present, under the traditional network 
environment, methods for defense against DDoS 
attacks mainly include attack detection and attack 
response [7]. DDoS Attack detection is based on 
attack signatures, congestion patterns, protocols, 
and source addresses as an important basis for 
detecting attacks, thereby establishing an 
effective detection mechanism. The detection 
model can be roughly divided into two categories: 
misuse-based detection and anomaly-based 
detection. Misuse-based detection is a technique 
based on feature-matching algorithms. It matches 
the collected and extracted user behavior features 
with the known feature database of DDoS attacks 
to identify whether an attack has occurred. 
Anomaly-based detection is adopted by 
monitoring systems. By establishing the target 
system and the user's normal behavior model, the 
monitoring systems can determine whether the 
states of the system and the user's activities 
deviate from the normal profile and can judge 
whether there is an attack. The attack response is 
to properly filter or limit the network traffic after 
the DDoS attack is initiated. The attack traffic to 
the attack target host is reduced as much as 
possible to mitigate the influence of the denial of 
a service attack. 
With the rise of cloud computing 
technologies and software-defined networking 
(SDN) concepts, DDoS attack detection based on 
cloud computing environments and software-
defined networks has received widespread 
attention [8, 9]. As a new computing model, cloud 
computing has powerful distributed computing 
capabilities, massive storage capabilities, and 
diverse service capabilities [10, 11]. It has 
become an important means of solving big data 
problems [12]. Therefore, establishing a cloud 
platform system is a necessary measure to 
effectively ensure cloud computing’s reliability, 
stability and security [13-15]. 
In recent years, machine learning has been 
applied to the field of security [16]. The method 
of constructing an attack detection model using 
machine learning has been widely used [17, 18]. 
The machine learning method plays an important 
role in the traditional network environment, the 
cloud environment and software-defined network 
architecture. The reason is that the machine 
learning method can deeply mine the important 
information hidden behind the data and combine 
prior knowledge to discriminate and predict new 
data [19]. Therefore, compared with traditional 
detection methods, machine learning methods can 
exhibit better detection accuracy [20-24]. In the 
above analysis of defense measures, it can be 
known that the traditional network environment, 
cloud environment and software-defined network 
architecture all involve attack detection for the 
defense mechanism of DDoS. Therefore, 
studying the use of machine learning methods to 
identify DDoS attacks is of great significance. 
However, the data generated by the DDoS attack 
is often burst and diverse, and the background 
traffic size also has a greater impact on the 
detection model, thereby reducing the model’s 
detection accuracy. 
To solve the above problems, we propose a 
multiple-kernel learning DDoS attack detection 
method. The method uses the algorithm to extract 
five features and combines two multiple-kernel 
learning models with the adaptive feature weights 
to recognize attack flows and normal flows. For 
further improving the accuracy of DDoS attack 
detection, a sliding window mechanism is 
employed to coordinate two multiple-kernel 
learning models treating the detection results. 
Experiments show that our method can better 
distinguish DDoS attack flow from normal flow 
and can detect DDoS attacks earlier. 
2. Related work 
DDoS attacks can cause tremendous damage 
to a network and often subject the attacked party 
to great economic losses. This is one of the main 
ways that hackers initiate cyberattacks. 
To reduce the damage of DDoS attacks, 
researchers have proposed a large number of 
attack detection methods in recent years. 
According to the application scenario, these 
methods can be divided into three categories: the 
detection method in the conventional network 
environment, the detection method in the cloud 
environment, and the detection method in the 
software-defined network (SDN) environment. 
(1) The conventional network environment 
refers to the Internet environment generally 
established on the Internet based on an open 
system interconnect reference model (OSI). In 
this regard, Saied et al. proposed a method for 
detecting known and unknown DDoS attacks 
using artificial neural networks [25]. Bhuyan et al. 
proposed an empirical evaluation method for the 
measurement of low-rate and high-rate DDoS 
attack detection information [26]. Tan et al. 
proposed a DDoS attack detection method based 
on multivariate correlation analysis [27]. Yu et al. 
proposed a DDoS attack detection method based 
on the traffic correlation coefficient [28]. Wang et 
al. conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
characteristics of DDoS botnets [29]. Kumar and 
others used the Jpcap API to monitor and analyze 
DDoS attacks [30]. Khundrakpam et al. proposed 
an application-layer DDoS attack detection 
method combining entropy and an artificial 
neural network [31]. 
(2) The cloud environment refers to the 
network service platform with cloud computing 
as the core technology. In this regard, Karnwal et 
al. proposed a defense method for XML DDoS 
and HTTP DDoS attacks under cloud computing 
platforms [34]; Sahi et al. proposed the check and 
defense method for TCP-flood DDoS attacks in 
the cloud environment [35]. Rukavitsyn et al. 
proposed a self-learning DDoS attack detection 
method in the cloud environment [36]. 
(3) Software-defined network refers to a new 
network architecture that adopts OpenFlow as the 
communication protocol and specifies the router 
as well as switch data exchange rules through the 
controller [37]. In this regard, Ashraf use 
machine-learning detection software to define 
DDoS attacks under the network [38]. Mihai–
Gabriel proposed an intelligent elastic risk 
assessment method based on the neural network 
and risk theory in the SDN environment [39]. Yan 
et al. proposed an effective controller scheduling 
method to reduce DDoS attacks in software-
defined networks [40]. Chin et al. proposed a 
DDoS flood attack method for selective detection 
of packets under SDN [41]. Dayal et al analyzed 
the behavioral characteristics of DDoS attacks 
under SDN [42]. Ye et al proposes a method of 
using SVM to detect DDoS attacks under the 
SDN environment [43]. Except the above 
detection methods used to ensure the security of 
the system, some efficient cryptography 
techniques can be applied to achieve privacy of 
the system [44-47]. 
In summary, the core issue of DDoS attack 
detection research is the construction of feature 
extraction and classification models. The attack 
detection methods in the above three 
environments can effectively detect DDoS attacks 
corresponding to the environment. However, in 
the detection of early DDoS attack, these defense 
methods do not have a good detection effect. In 
addition, most of these methods use a single 
feature and do not consider the impact of 
multidimensional features on the classifier. 
Therefore, an adaptive DDoS attack detection 
method is proposed in this paper. Firstly, we 
design the algorithms to extract five features. 
Secondly, through an ensemble learning 
framework, the five features are used to train two 
multi-kernel learning models and obtain the 
adaptive feature weights with gradient method. 
Finally, the sliding window mechanism is used to 
coordinate the two models to improve the 
detection accuracy. 
3. DDoS attack feature extraction 
3.1 Analysis of DDoS attack behavior 
In the cloud environment, the botnets of 
DDoS attacks have distributed characteristics. 
Each zombie machine has the ability to 
independently calculate, send and process data 
packets, and the source IP address of the packets 
can also be forged. The advantage of these DDoS 
attacks make defense more difficult. However, 
under the background of time series, the 
characteristics of data packets generated by 
DDoS attacks are still quite different from those 
of normal users. The difference is reflected in the 
following three aspects: 
(1) Asymmetry 
DDoS attack is often caused by multiple 
zombie hosts sending a large number of packets 
to a host without the host’s response. These 
useless packets quickly consumes the host's 
service resources so that the host can no longer 
provide services to other users. With this feature, 
the DDoS attack behavior is such that there are a 
large amount of packets sent to the host form the 
zombie hosts, and there are no or a small amount 
of packets sent to the zombie hosts form the host. 
The IP data packet often presents a situation in 
which multiple-source IP addresses point to the 
same or several destination IP addresses, which is 
expressed as the asymmetry of the source IP as 
well as the destination IP in sending and receiving. 
(2) Interactivity 
Assuming that there are A (zombie host) and 
B (attacked host). When an attack occurs, there 
are two main communication ways as follows: (1) 
A sends packets to B (denoted as A→B); (2) A 
and B send packets to each other (denoted as 
A⇄B). And the packet amount sent with the way 
(A→B) is much more than those sent with the 
way (A⇄B). Therefore, the interactivity of DDoS 
attack flow has different states in communication 
direction and amount compared with normal flow. 
(3) Distribution 
According to the characteristics of DDoS 
attack, when an attack occurs, the number of the 
hosts that launch the attack is much larger than 
that of the attacked hosts. And the number of the 
source IP address is much larger than that of the 
destination IP address, so that the source address 
and the destination address have different 
distribution characteristics. In addition, because 
DDoS attacks generate useless requests, so 
compared to normal flows, the host ports of 
accessed by the attack requests are more 
dispersed. Therefore, the distribution of the ports 
is different in normal flows and attack flows. 
Due to the limited ability of a single feature 
to express data, it cannot fully reflect the 
characteristics of the DDoS attack. Therefore, to 
effectively express the characteristics of the 
DDoS attack, this paper selects five feature 
extraction methods based on the above 
characteristics. That is, the address correlation 
degree (ACD) combines the traffic burstiness, 
flow asymmetry, and source IP address 
distribution of DDoS attack; the IP flow features 
value (FFV) exploits the asymmetry of attack 
flows and the distribution of source IP addresses; 
the IP flow’s interaction behavior feature (IBF) 
uses the different interactivity between normal 
flows and attack flows on the network; the IP flow 
multi-feature fusion (MFF) exploits the different 
behavioral characteristics of normal flows as well 
as DDoS attack flows and integrates the multiple 
characteristics of DDoS attack flows; the IP flow 
address half interaction anomaly degree (HIAD) 
focuses on the characteristics of the aggregated 
attack flows that are mixture of a large number of 
normal background flows. In order to make the 
feature richer in representation, we refer to 
several articles and combine the five feature 
extraction algorithms, besides removing the less 
impactful parameters to form a multidimensional 
feature for DDoS attack detection. [46–52]. 
3.2 DDoS attack feature extraction 
In the cloud environment, assume that 
network flow F  is as follows:
1, 1 1 1 2, 2 2 2 ,( , , ),( , , ),....., ( , , )n n n nt s d p t s d p t s d p    in a 
certain unit of time, where , , ,i i i it s d p   denotes 
the time, source IP address, destination IP address 
and the port of the ( 1,2,....., )i i n=  -th data 
packet, respectively. All data packets which 
contain source IP address iA  and destination IP 
address jA  are denoted as class ( , )i jSD A A  . 
All data packets with source IP address iA  are 
denoted as class ( )iIPS A . All data packets with 
destination IP address jA  are denoted as class
D( )jIP A  . The packets with source IP address 
iA  which exist in the class ( )iIPS A  and class
( )iIPD A   are denoted as   ( )iIF A  . The 
packets with source IP address iA  which exist 
in class ( )iIPS A   and do not exist class 
( )iIPD A  are denoted as ( )iSH A . The number 
of the different ports in ( )iSH A  is denoted as
( ( ))iPort SH A . The packets with the destination 
IP address iA   which do not exist in class 
( )iIPS A   and exist in class ( )iIPD A   are 
denoted as ( )iDH A . The number of the different 
ports in ( )iDH A   is denoted as
( ( ))iPort DH A . 
Definition 1: If there are different 
destination IP addresses jA   and kA  , making 
classes ( , )i jSD A A   and ( , )i kSD A A   both 
non-null, then delete the class where all source IP 
address iA packets reside. 
Assume that the last remaining classes are 
denoted as 1 2, ,....., mACS ACS ACS  , and are 
statistically calculated to gain the ACD. The 
detailed formulation is as follows: 
 
   (1)     
                        
In this part
1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )(0 1)i i iW ACS Port ACS Packet ACS  = + −  
where ( )iPort ACS  is the number of different 
ports in class iACS  , ( )iPacket ACS   is the 
number of data packets in class iACS , and 1  
is the weighted value. 
Definition 2: If all the packets whose 
destination IP address is jA   form the unique 
class ( , )i jSD A A  , delete the class where the 
1
( )
m
F i
i
ACD W ACS
=
=
packet with the destination IP address is jA . 
Assume that the last remaining classes are 
denoted as 1 2, ,....., lSDS SDS SDS  , and all 
packets in these remaining classes with the 
destination IP address jA  are denoted as
( )jSDD A , and all the classes are denoted as 
1 2, ,....., mSDD SDD SDD  . The FFV is 
defined as follow:  
( )
1
( )
m
F i
i
FFV CIP SDD m
=
= −    (2)          
( )iCIP SDD   in formula (2) is presented as 
follows: 
( )
( )
2
1
( ) ( ( ))
iNum SDD
i i j
j
CIP SDD Num SDD OA Pack A
=
= + 
2(1 )+ − ( ( ( )) 1)iOB Port SDD −
 (3). 
In this equation, 20 1   , ( )iNum SDD  
is the number of different source IP address in 
iSDD ; 
3
3
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0 ( ) /
j j
j
j
Pack A Pack A t
OA Pack A
Pack A t


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= 
 
, ( )jPack A is the number of source IP addresses 
jA  in iSDD  , and 3  is the threshold of the 
number of packets: 
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, ( )iPort SDD   is the number of different 
destination ports in iSDD , 4  is the threshold 
of the number of ports, and t  is the sampling 
time. 
Definition 3: Assume that the IF flow is
1 2, ,......, MIF IF IF  , the SH class is denoted as
1 2, ,..... SSH SH SH , and the DH class is denoted 
as 1 2, ,......, MDH DH DH  ; then, define IBF as 
follows: 
1
1
(| | ( ( ))
1
S
i
i
IBF S D over Port SH
M =
= − + +
+
       
1
( ( )))
D
i
i
over Port DH
=

 (4)  
                             
, where 5  is the 
threshold of the amount of port. M in formula 
(4) is the number of IF flows within t  , 
| |S D−  is the absolute value of the difference 
value between the number of source IP addresses 
and the number of destination IP addresses for all 
SH and DH flows in t . 
Definition 4: Assume that the resulting SD 
classes are 
1 2, , lSD SD SD  and IF classes are 
1 2, , MIF IF IF  . The number of packets of 
source IP address 
iA  in class iIF  is denoted as 
iSn ,where i = 1, 2, ..., M; the number of packets 
of all interworking flow classes is denoted as SN; 
and the source semi-interactive flow class is 
denoted as
1 2, , SSH SH SH  . The number of 
different port in class 
iSH  is denoted as 
( iPort SH）, where i = 1, 2, ..., S; the destination 
semi-interactive class is denoted as 
1 2D , , DH DH DH  ; and the number of 
different port in class 
iDH  is denoted as 
5
5
/
( )
0 /
x x t
over x
x t


 
= 
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( iPort DH）, where i = 1, 2, ..., D. 
The weighted value of all packets in SH 
class is defined as follows:
( )
1
( )
s
SH i
i
Weight oversh Packet SH
=
=   (5)                
The weighted value of all packets in SD 
classes is defined as follows: 
( )
1
( )
L
SD i
i
Weight oversd Packet SD
=
=   (6)                
The weighted value of the number of packets 
of network flow F in unit time T is as follows: 
( )packet SD SD SDWeight flag Weight Weight Weight= +  (7)   
 In these equations, 
6
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 ,  ∆𝑡  is sampling time, 
6  and 7   are SH-type packet number 
abnormality thresholds; 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑆𝐷𝑖)  is the 
number of packets in 𝑆𝐷𝑖  , I = 1, 2, ..., n. The 
weighted value of the number of different ports in 
the SH and DH classes is as follows: 
1
( ( ))
S
port i
i
Weight overp Port SH
=
= +     
1
( ( ))
D
j
j
overp Port DH
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    (8) 
where, 
8
8
, /
( )
0, /
x x t
overp x
x t



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 , ∆𝑡  is 
sampling time, 8  is the SH-type port number 
abnormality threshold. 
In this part we define the MFF is as follows: 
S
1
port packet
F
Weight Weight
MFF
M
+ +
=
+
   (9)                
where
, 1
( )
1, 1
x x
f x
x
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= 
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. 
Definition 5: The number of SH flows with 
different source IP addresses and the same 
destination IP address 𝐴𝑖 is denoted as ℎ𝑛𝑖. The 
SH class with the same destination IP address 𝐴𝑖 
flow is denoted as ( , )i iHSD hn A  , where i = 1, 
2 ,..., n. 
Assume that all HSD classes are 
1 2, , kHSD HSD HSD
 , and the number of 
different destination port in the class 
iHSD  is 
expressed as ( iPort HSD）, where i = 1, 2 ,..., k. 
The HIAD is defined as follows:  
( )( )( )
1
k
F i I
i
HIAD hn weight Port HSD
=
 
= + 
 
   (10)               
In eq. (10),
9
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, /
( )
0, /
x x t
weight x
x t



= 
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 , 
∆t is sampling time, and 9  is the threshold for 
different destination port. 
4. The DDoS attack detection 
model 
The establishment of an attack detection 
model is an important part of the whole detection 
process. Based on the behavior of DDoS attack, 
we extract ACD, IBF, MFF, HIAD and FFV 
features to express the inherent rules of attack 
flows. The disadvantages of the current DDoS 
attack detection models are summarized as 
follows: (1) some models highly depend on the 
selection of kernel function; (2) some models 
require data with highly stable value; (3) some 
models can only fit linear rules, but DDoS attack 
can generate linearly inseparable data due to 
abrupt, unstable and stochastic characteristics. 
Considering that the multiple-kernel learning 
model has a low requirement for data stability and 
can be used for nonlinear fitting, furthermore, it 
can treat flexibly linear and nonlinear data, this 
paper proposes an adaptive DDoS attack 
detection method based on the ensemble learning 
framework. 
4.1 The multiple-kernel learning model 
The multiple-kernel learning (MKL) model 
is developed from the original single- kernel 
SVM. In single- kernel SVM, a SVM only uses 
one kernel function to map the sample to high 
dimensional spaces. By comparison, the multiple-
kernel learning model uses multiple-kernel 
functions with weight to map the sample to high-
dimensional space. Therefore, it has higher 
flexibility and adaptability on heterogeneous data. 
The multiple kernel learning is defined as 
follows: given training set 
1 1 2 2T {( , ),( , ) ( , )}n nx y x y x y=
, 
testing set 
' ' '
1 2{ , }sC x x x=  , i
dx R  , 
'
k
dx R , ( 1, 1)iy  − + , R is real-number set, 
d is data dimension, 1,2, ,i n=  , 
1,2,k s=  . ' ' '1 2( , ), ( , ) ( , )MK x x K x x K x x
are kernel functions in d dR R , 1 2, M    is 
a kernel mapping for each function. In the classic 
multiple-kernel learning SimpleMKL [53], the 
objective function of the hyperplane is as follows: 
1
( ) ( , ( ))
M
m m
m
f x x b 
=
= +    (11)                                                         
where m  is the weight for each kernel 
function, and b is bias. The relaxation factor is  . 
According to the principle of minimum structure, 
the objective function can be optimized as follows: 
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m m iH
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1 1
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By the two-order alternation optimization, 
the formula (12) can be converted to the 
optimization problem with md as the variable: 
0
1
min ( ), 1
M
m
d
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
=
=              (14)                                                   
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The Lagrange function of ( )J d   is as 
follows: 
m
n
2
m iH
1 i=1
1 1
L +C +
2
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m md
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−
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m n
i i m i
i=1 m=1 i=1
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 (16) 
where i , i   are Lagrange operators. First,
, ,m ib   are calculated for partial derivatives. 
Then, the extremums are gained when the partial 
derivatives are “0.” Finally, extremums are 
brought into the Lagrange function, which can be 
further changed to: 
i,j=1 1
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max ( ) - ( , )
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m n
i j i j d i j i
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Q y y K x x  
=
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.        (18)                                   
The gradient descent method is used to 
adjust ( )J d  on d, update d, and optimize the d 
as well as a alternately. Then, an optimal solution 
is obtained: 
*
1 2= , , n   （ , ）; that is, the original 
objective function eventually turns into (19). The 
detailed formulation is as follows:  
*
1 1
( ) ( , )
n M
i i m d i j
i m
f x y d K x x b
= =
= +     (19)                               
jx C  . When the test set data as jx  is 
inputted to ( )f x  , the object function can 
determine the category of test set data. 
4.2 The attack detection model based on 
multiple-kernel learning 
The SimpleMKL model can be suitable for 
the all dimension weight values with “1”. But it 
cannot fully exert the different features. This 
paper uses the feature weights to control the effect 
of different features on the model. To gain the 
appropriate feature weights in the SimpleMKL 
model, we combine the gradient method to 
optimize the weight parameters, so that the 
detection accuracy is further improved. 
We marked ACD as , IBF as , MFF 
as  , HIAD as  , and FFV as  , then the 
feature value vector is , 
and the marked weight vector is 
 . Combinatorial 
features are * TCF F W= , and the mean value 
of each dimension of normal flow is , , 
, , or . Note the mean value of each 
dimension of the attack flow is , , , 
, or . 
The inter-class mean squared difference is 
expressed as follows: 
2 2
1 11 21 2 12 22[ *( )] [ *( )]M w u u w u u= − + − +
 
2 2 2
3 13 23 4 14 24 5 15 25[ *( )] [ *( )] [ *( )]w u u w u u w u u− + − + −
 
The normal intra-class variance is denoted: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 11 2 2 12 3 3 13
i 1
[ *( )] [ *( )] [ *( )]
n
i i iS w x u w x u w x u
=
= − + − + − +
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The attack intra-class variance is denoted: 
2 2 2
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1
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i i i
i
S w x u w x u w x u
=
= − + − + − +  
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  The intra-class variance is 1 2S S S= +  . 
To improve classification accuracy and ensure a 
rapid convergence of functions, on the one hand, 
we should try to improve the mean difference 
between positive and negative samples, so that 
the two kinds of samples are far away from each 
other, that is, we should increase the M value. On 
the other hand, we should minimize the 
differences between samples. The variance 
corresponding to each dimension should be as 
small as possible, thus reducing the S value. 
Therefore, the classification model needs to train 
two different classifiers to classify the samples. 
One classifier is inter-class mean squared 
difference growth (M-SMKL) and the other 
1x 2x
3x 4x 5x
),,,,( 54321 xxxxxF =
),,,,( 54321 wwwwwW =
11u 12u
13u 14u 15u
21u 22u 23u
24u 25u
classifier is intra-class variance descent (S-
SMKL). In combination with the SimpleMKL 
framework formula (12), the above problems can 
be transformed into (20). The detailed 
formulation is as follows: 
m
n
2
m m iH
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s.t. 
 
 
 
(21) 
.     
 
 
 
If      , the objective function is M-
SMKL. If     , the objective function is S-
SMKL.    and    are converted to the 
learning rate of formula (29). 
To solve the above problems, we use the way 
of iterative updating weights to get the objective 
function. The details are as follows. Firstly, the 
weights of each feature are assigned initial values. 
Secondly, combine with the (20) and (21) to gain 
optimal function of this time. The mathematical 
form is expressed as follows: 
i,j=1 1
1
max ( ) ( , )
2
m n
i j i j d i j i
i
Q y y K wx wx  
=
= − + 
  (22) 
s.t. 
  
 
 
 (23) 
 
The optimal equation obtained using the 
above equations (22) and (23) is as follows: 
*
1 1
( ) ( , )
n M
i i m d i j
i m
f x y d K wx wx b
= =
= +  .    (24)                               
To further determine whether the optimal 
equation has achieved good results, this paper sets 
two constraint conditions for M-SMKL and S-
SMKL respectively without conflict with the 
formula (21) constraint conditions. These 
constraint conditions is expressed as follows: 
The constraint conditions of M-SMKL are as 
follows: 
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The constraint conditions of S-SMKL are as 
follows: 
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where the values of  𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4 are close to 
“0”; the values of 𝑡1, 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 are close to “1”; 
the values of  𝑡4, 𝑡5, 𝑡6 are close to “7.5”. If the 
constraint condition is satisfied, the algorithm 
will be stopped and the formula (24) will become 
the optimal function, otherwise, the each 
dimension weight will be updated iteratively. The 
gradient of M and S corresponding to the each 
dimension weight is as follows: 
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(28)                    
where 
1n is the number of the normal flow 
feature of the training sample; 
2n  is the number 
of the attack flow feature of the training sample. 
According to gradients in equations (27) and (28), 
the weight of each dimension is updated as 
follows (29): 
1 1 1 2
1 1
2 2 1 2
2 2
3 3 1 2
3 3
4 4 4 2
4 4
5 5 1 2
5 5
2* * 2* *
2* * 2* *
2* * 2* *
2* * 2* *
2* * 2* *
M S
w w lr lr
w w
M S
w w lr lr
w w
M S
w w lr lr
w w
M S
w w lr lr
w w
M S
w w lr lr
w w
  
= + −
 

  
= + −
 
  
= + −
 
  
= + −
 
  
= + −
 
  (29)  
where 
1lr  is the learning rate of gradient ascent; 
2lr  is the learning rate of gradient descent. 1lr  
has the same function as   and  
2lr  has the 
same function as 

. Each weight of the updated 
is multiplied by each original feature accordingly 
and the next round of iteration is carried out 
4.3 Framework of multiple-kernel learning 
detection based on ensemble learning 
We input the multidimensional data with 
weight and set the learning rate. Then two 
different classifiers are trained. M-SMKL is 
trained by increasing the M value mainly with 
reducing the S value secondarily and the S-SMKL 
is trained by reducing the S value mainly with 
increasing the M value secondarily. During the 
training process, the M value and the S value are 
constantly updated with the method of gradient 
rising and descending until the constraint 
conditions are met. The flowchart is provided in 
Figure 1. 
The detection process is as follows: firstly, 
the test data is multiplied with two different 
weight vector which are trained earlier; secondly, 
the calculated data are inputted to the 
corresponding M-SMKL and S-SMKL model; 
finally, use the sliding window mechanism to 
coordinate two kinds of models. The sliding 
window mechanism is described as follows. 
Firstly, a sliding window with a size of n is 
created. Secondly, the trained M-SMKL classifies 
the test data and obtain the first classification 
results; the trained S-SMKL classifies the test 
data and obtain the second classification results. 
Finally, four kinds of ways are used to 
cooperatively treat the first classification results 
and the second classification results, the details 
are as follows: (1) if M-SMKL and S-SMKL 
identify that the current data category is both 
normal, the current data category is judged to be 
normal; (2) if M-SMKL and S-SMKL identify 
that the current data category is both attack, the 
current data category is judged to be attack; (3) if 
M-SMKL identify that the current data category 
is normal but S-SMKL identify that the current 
data category is attack, the current data category 
is judged to be attack; (4) if M-SMKL identify 
that the current data category is attack but S-
SMKL  
Figure 1: Flow chart of multiple-kernel learning training process based on ensemble
Learning 
identify that the current data category is normal, 
then, step 1. move the starting point of the sliding 
window to the current position of the test data in 
the first classification result, and map the end 
point of the sliding window to the  n-1 position 
of the first classification results; step 2. if the 
results in the sliding window are all attack, the 
current data category is judged to be attack, 
otherwise, the current data category is judged to 
be normal. The flow chart is provided in Figure 2. 
The reason for the training of two kinds of 
SMKL is that S-SMKL focuses on reducing the 
difference between the data of each dimension 
and can assemble the two types of samples in their 
respective central positions. However, S-SMKL 
does not consider the location of the two sample-
center points. Although a better classification 
feature can be maintained on the whole, it is 
impossible to identify DDoS attacks earlier 
because of center distance of the normal flow and 
attack flow is small. M-SMKL focuses on the 
difference between the two types of data centers 
and maximizes the sample centers distance 
between the two types of sample centers, making 
the two samples as separate as possible. M-SMKL 
can expand the distance of different class so that 
the attack flow can be identified earlier but it 
makes intra-class data dispersed, causing default 
results. Therefore, the sliding window mechanism 
is adopted to coordinate the two models to detect 
early DDoS accurately. 
5. Experimental analysis 
5.1 Experimental Data Sets and Evaluation 
Standards 
The data set used for this experiment is the 
CAIDA "DDoS Attack 2007" data set [54]. This 
data set contains an [L1] Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) anonymous traffic attack for 
approximately one hour on August 4, 2007. The 
total size of the data set is 21 GB, which accounts 
for approximately one hour (20:50:08 UTC–
21:56:16 UTC). Attacks began around 21:13, 
causing the network load to grow rapidly (in 
minutes) from approximately 200 kbits/s to 80 
megabits/s. One hour of attack traffic is divided 
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into 5 minutes of files and stored in PCAP format. 
The contents of this data set are TCP network 
traffic packets. Each TCP packet contains the 
source address, destination address, source port, 
destination port, packet size, and protocol type. 
The duration of normal flow data used in this 
paper is 2 minutes in total, and the duration of 
attack data is 5 minutes in total.  
 
Figure 2: Flow chart of multiple kernel 
learning detection process based on ensemble 
learning. 
The hardware equipment adopted is 8 GB 
memory, Intel Core i7 processor and a computer 
with a Windows 10 64-bit system; the 
development environment is MATLAB 2014a 
and Codeblocks 10.05. The evaluation criteria 
used in this paper consist of the detection rate 
(DR), the false alarm rate (FR), and total error rate 
(ER). 
Assume that TP indicates that the number of 
normal test samples is properly marked, FP 
indicates the number of normal test samples that 
have been incorrectly marked, TN indicates the 
number of attack test samples that are correctly 
marked, and FN indicates the number of attack 
test samples that have been incorrectly marked: 
TN
DR
TN FN
FP
FR
TP FP
FN FP
ER
TP FP TN FN

= +
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+
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.          (30) 
We used the above five feature extraction 
algorithms to extract features from the data set. 
The extracted feature values are normalized and 
used as a training set. The data in the training set 
can be regarded as the regularity of the change in 
network traffic. The network traffic has an abrupt 
and volatile nature. Therefore, although the 
collected network data have similarities with the 
conventional ones, they still have a certain degree 
of difference. To simulate this phenomenon for 
verifying the effectiveness of the presented 
method, three types of data are generated as 
follows: (1) Each normal flow feature values and 
attack flow feature values are multiplied by 
random number; (2) only the attack flow feature 
values are multiplied by random number; (3) only 
the normal flow feature values are multiplied by 
random number. 
5.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
Five features are used to extract feature data 
from attack data and normal data, and positive as 
well as negative sample sets are obtained. The 
sampling time is set to 1 s, and the remaining 
parameters of the five feature extraction methods 
are set as follow: 𝜃1  = 0.5, 𝜃2  = 0.5, 𝜃3  = 3, 
𝜃4 = 3, 𝜃5 = 3, 𝜃6 = 3, 𝜃7 = 3, 𝜃8 = 3, and 𝜃9 = 
3. A total of normal feature values is 211 and a 
total of attack feature values is 280. Figure 3-9 
illustrates the feature values extracted by the five 
algorithms. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the early attack 
feature values of DDoS attack are close to the 
normal feature values. This is because there are a 
large number of bidirectional flows in the early 
stage of the DDoS attack and these bidirectional 
flows gradually decrease with the increase of the 
Multiply initial data with new weight 
of S-SMKL
Classify test set with S-SMKL
Classify Result 1
Multiply initial data with new weight 
of M-SMKL
Classify test set with M-SMKL
Classify Result 2
Slide Window Process
Final Predict Result
attack degree. Therefore, using the ACD as a 
feature after 70 seconds can significantly reflect 
the difference between the attack flow and the 
normal flow. ACD can be able to reflect the 
difference between normal flow and attack flow 
earliest. 
 
Figure 3: The ACD feature graph of DDoS 
attack flow and normal flow. 
As illustrated in Figure 4, compared with 
ACD, although IBF does not recognize the attack 
flow earlier, the distribution range of its feature 
values is more uniform and presents a certain 
degree of volatility. This makes the feature less 
susceptible to individual outliers. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the FFV feature is 
very similar to the ACD, but as illustrated in 
Figure. 6 and Figure 7, in the initial stage, the 
FFV is more capable of reflecting the difference 
between the attack flow and the normal flow than 
the ACD is. 
As illustrated in Figure 8, although the 
MFF feature cannot determine the attack flow 
and the normal flow as early as possible, it can 
make the feature values of the attack stage 
more stable, so that it can avoid the outliers of 
attack flows. . 
 
Figure 4: The IBF feature graph of DDoS 
attack flow and normal flow. 
 
Figure 5: The FFV feature graph of 
DDoS attack flow and normal flow. 
 
Figure 6: The ACD feature graph of 
DDoS attack flow and normal flow in the first 
10 seconds. 
 Figure 7: The FFV feature graph of DDoS 
attack flow and normal flow in the first 10 
seconds. 
 
Figure 8: The MFF feature graph of 
DDoS attack flow and normal flow. 
As illustrated in Figure 9, it can be seen 
from the value of the ordinate that the HIAD 
best reflects the difference between the normal 
flow and the attack flow while having better 
stability in the latter half of the attack flow. 
After the early data, this feature can greatly 
distinguish between normal flow and abnormal 
flow, influence the classifier more and make 
better decisions. 
In summary, all five features have their 
own unique characteristics. To make full use of 
the characteristics of each feature, the feature 
values extracted by these five algorithms are 
each used as a five-dimensional-feature data set. 
Using these five feature values as training sets, 
two multiple kernel learning models dominated 
by gradient ascent and gradient descent are 
trained into the algorithm, and corresponding 
five-dimensional feature weight vectors are 
obtained. Finally, according to the framework 
of figure 2, the classification results of test set 
are obtained and are used to verify the 
effectiveness of method. The parameters of M-
SMKL are set as follow: l𝑟1 = 2 ∗ 10
−5, l𝑟2 =
2 ∗ 10−3 ,  𝑡1 = 1.002 ,  𝑡2 = 1.0065 ,  𝑡3 =
1.007 ,  𝑝1 = 0.000084 ,  and 𝑝2 = 0.000001 . 
The parameters of S-SMKL are set as follow: 
l𝑟1 = 2 ∗ 10
−5 ,  l𝑟2 = 2 ∗ 10
−2 ,  𝑡4 =
7.3425 ,  𝑡5 = 7.8340 ,  𝑡6 = 7.8350 ,  𝑝3 =
0.000775 ,  and 𝑝4 = 0.000680 . The size of 
the sliding window is 8. The parameters for 
multiple-kernel learning are all default values, 
and the kernel function includes two Gaussian 
functions and two polynomial functions. The 
SVM parameters are all default values, and the 
kernel function is linear function. The 
experimental results are illustrated in Figures 
10–18. 
 
Figure 9: The HIAD feature graph of 
DDoS attack flow and normal flow. 
 
Figure 10: The DR contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for scaling attack flow and normal 
flow. 
 Figure 11: The ER contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for scaling attack flow and normal 
flow. 
 
Figure 12: The FR contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for scaling attack flow and normal 
flow. 
 
Figure 13: The DR contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for narrowing the attack flow. 
 
Figure 14: The ER contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for narrowing the attack flow. 
 
Figure 15: The FR contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for narrowing the attack flow. 
 
Figure 16: The DR contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for amplifying the normal flow. 
 
Figure 17: The ER contrast diagram of four 
algorithms for amplifying the normal flow. 
As shown in figure 10-18, under the three 
types of experiments, according to the three 
evaluation criteria, the overall performance of the 
algorithms from the highest to the lowest is the 
method of the ADADM, the SVM method, the 
SMKL method and Nezhad et al’s method [55]. 
This is because although the method 
described by Nezhad et al. [55] is visibly superior 
to other methods in terms of DR indicators, it is 
far worse than other methods with respect to other 
indicators. The reason is that the Nezhad et al [55] 
method relies excessively on the first reference 
point. When the first reference point fluctuates, 
this method recognizes easily some normal 
samples as attack samples. 
Although the classification accuracy of the 
attack samples is high, a large number of normal 
samples are misjudged, so this method is superior 
in terms of DR and its other indicators are inferior 
to those of other methods. This is why, in this case, 
the Nezhad et al [55]’s method performs the worst. 
The effect of SVM is generally better than that of 
the SMKL method because although the SMKL 
method coordinates multiple kernel functions to 
map the sample to a high-dimensional Hilbert 
space, the linear kernel function is obviously 
more suitable for the sample. Using the linear 
kernel SVM can establish a better hyperplane 
than the SMKL method to identify the data 
containing early DDoS attacks. However, 
although the multiple-kernel learning method 
does not use a linear kernel function that is more 
suitable for the sample space, it can still maintain 
high accuracy, indicating that multiple-kernel 
learning has a lower dependence on the selection 
of kernel functions than the single kernel SVM. 
We compared the ADADM to the SVM 
method. The ADADM method uses the same 
kernel function as SMKL method. Because the 
multi-kernel learning method is flexible and 
adaptable, it is possible to continuously optimize 
the hyperplane by adjusting the weights of the 
feature of each dimension to recognize the DDoS 
as early as possible. Attack flow data and normal 
flow data are located on both sides of the 
hyperplane. 
Table 1: Comparison results of four algorithms for scaling attack flow and normal flow 
In addition, using the idea of ensemble 
learning to train two different classifiers and 
using the sliding window mechanism to further 
synthesize the advantage of each classifier 
 The value of the random multiplier 
0.6–0.7 0.7–0.8 0.8–0.9 0.9–1.1 1.0–1.5 1.5–2.0 2.0–3.0 3.0–4.0 4.0–5.0 
ADADM 
method 
DR (%) 78.57 78.57 78.57 78.57 78.21 78.21 78.21 78.21 78.57 
FR (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER (%) 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.42 12.42 12.42 12.42 12.22 
SimpleM
KL    
method 
DR (%) 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 
FR (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER (%) 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 
SVM  
method 
DR (%) 77.50 77.50 77.86 77.86 76.79 77.50 77.86 76.79 77.86 
FR (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER (%) 12.83 12.83 12.63 12.63 13.24 12.83 12.63 13.24 12.63 
Nezhad et 
al [55]’s   
method 
DR (%) 98.21 97.85 98.21 97.85 98.21 98.21 98.21 97.85 98.21 
FR (%) 74.29 74.76 74.29 74.76 75.71 74.29 74.29 74.29 72.38 
ER (%) 32.92 33.33 32.92 33.33 33.54 32.92 32.92 33.13 32.11 
improves the algorithm’s performance in the 
three types of experiments. This method we 
propose outperforms not only the SVM method 
but also other methods of DDoS attack detection. 
The experimental data are presented in Table 1, 
Table 2, and Table 3. 
 
Figure 18: The FR contrast diagram of four algorithms for amplifying the normal flow
Table 2: Comparison results of four algorithms for narrowing the attack flow 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, five-dimensional features are 
defined for describing the burstiness of DDoS 
attack flows, the distribution of IP source 
addresses and the interactivity of DDoS attack 
flows. Based on the five-dimensional features and 
the ensemble learning framework, adaptive 
feature weights are obtained and the M-SMKL 
and S-SMKL multiple kernel learning models are 
trained to detect DDoS attack. For identifying 
early attacks effectively, the sliding window 
mechanism is used to coordinate the S-SMKL and 
the M-SMKL to deal with the detection results.  
 The value of the random multiplier 
0.1–0.2 0.2–0.3 0.3–0.4 0.4–0.5 0.5–0.6 0.6–0.7 0.7–0.8 0.8–0.9 0.9–1.0 
ADADM 
method 
DR (%) 78.21 78.21 78.21 78.57 78.57 78.57 78.57 78.57 78.57 
FR (%) 10.99 1.42 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER (%) 17.15 13.04 12.42 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 12.22 
SimpleM
KL  
method 
DR (%) 75.71 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 76.43 
FR (%) 22.75 4.74 1.42 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER (%) 23.63 15.48 14.05 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 13.44 
SVM  
method 
DR (%) 76.07 77.14 77.50 77.86 77.50 77.86 77.86 77.50 77.86 
FR(%) 22.75 4.74 1.42 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ER(%) 23.42 15.07 13.44 12.83 12.83 12.63 12.63 12.83 12.63 
Nezhad et 
al [55]’s   
method 
DR(%) 97.13 97.85 98.57 98.21 98.57 98.57 98.21 98.21 97.85 
FR(%) 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 74.29 
ER (%) 33.54 33.13 32.72 32.92 32.72 32.72 32.92 32.92 33.13 
Experimental results show that, compared with 
similar methods, our method can produce more 
accurate results for detecting early DDoS attack. 
We believe that the approach will have great value 
in the security of cloud computing, cloud robotics 
[56], intelligent transportation [57], IOT and so 
on. 
In the follow-up work, we will further study 
how to transform the multi-dimensional weight 
adaptive problem based on multiple kernel 
learning into a convex optimization problem, and 
improve the detection rate and convergence speed 
of the method.
Table 3: Comparison results of four algorithms for amplifying the normal flow 
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